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Abstract 
Background: In primary care, financial incentives have usually been directed to physicians because they are thought 
to make the key decisions in order to change the functions of a medical organization. There are no studies regarding 
the impact that directing these incentives to all disciplines of the care team (e.g. group bonuses for both nurses and 
doctors) may have, despite the low frequency with which diagnoses were being recorded for primary care visits to 
doctors. This study tested the effect of offering group bonuses to the care teams.
Methods: This was a retrospective quasi-experimental study with before-and-after settings and two control groups. 
In the intervention group, the mean percentage of visits to a doctor for which a diagnosis was recorded by each indi-
vidual care team (mean team-based percentage of monthly visits to a doctor with recorded diagnoses) and simulta-
neously the same data was gathered from two different primary care settings where no team bonuses were applied. 
To study the sustainability of changes obtained with the group bonuses the respective data were derived from the 
electronic health record system for 2 years after the cessation of the intervention. The differences in the rate of mark-
ing diagnoses was analyzed with ANOVA and RM-ANOVA with appropriate post hoc tests, and the differences in the 
rate of change in marking diagnoses was analyzed with linear regression followed by t-test.
Results: The proportion of doctor visits having recorded diagnoses in the teams was about 55 % before starting to 
use group bonuses and 90 % after this intervention. There was no such increase in control units. The effect of the 
intervention weakened slightly after cessation of the group bonuses.
Conclusion: Group bonuses may provide a method to alter clinical practices in primary care. However, sustainability 
of these interventions may diminish after ceasing this type of financial incentive.
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Background
Tailored payment systems have been used in attempts to 
achieve policy objectives, such as improving the quality 
of care or recruitment to under-served areas, because 
the method by which physicians are paid may affect 
their professional practice [1, 2]. Conventionally, these 
financial incentives have been directed to physicians 
because they are thought to make the key decisions to 
change the functions of a medical organization [3–5]. 
There are ample recent studies concerning how deliver-
ing financial incentives to primary care physicians alone 
may alter the physicians’ behavior of and thereby the per-
formance of the care system [6–12].
Yet, in modern multidisciplinary health care systems 
there are also other quite autonomous actors, such as 
nurses who specialize in the treatment of diabetes [4, 
5, 13, 14], who may influence the functions of their 
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organization significantly and also improve the quality of 
the care. Thus, also other disciplines than doctors might 
well be considered as objects for financial incentives in 
improving the quality of care. Improving the recording of 
diagnoses of acute and chronic diseases might theoreti-
cally serve as one of the most important targets [15–18], 
and would therefore be a suitable element to improve by 
financial incentives. The recording of diagnoses in only 
40–60  % of doctor visits in the care units was deemed 
insufficient by the administration of the primary health 
care of Espoo City. A higher frequency of recorded diag-
noses was deemed necessary for planning activities and 
to manage the resources of primary health care. This led 
to the present intervention and study.
The aim of the present study was to examine whether it 
is possible to improve clinical practice by increasing the 
recording of the diagnoses through the use of financial 
incentives to all disciplines in the care team (e.g. group 
bonuses). We were also interested in how enduring these 
changes in the frequency of to registering the diagno-
ses would be after cessation of payment of these group 
bonuses.
Methods
This study was performed in Espoo city where in 2006 
there were 230,000 inhabitants. As everywhere in Fin-
land, primary care is non-profit and it is maintained 
by municipalities which fund this activity with taxes. 
In Espoo, there are five municipal health service areas 
which each contain 3–6 care teams. Altogether the num-
ber of care teams was 23. There were 6–8 doctors and 
6–8 nurses per team. The precise amount of doctors and 
nurses varied slightly over the study period.
This is a retrospective quasi-experimental study. The 
executive of Espoo primary care defined the areas where 
improvement was desired and their goal levels at the 
start of 2005. Improvement of recording diagnoses of 
the patient charts was chosen as the main goal. In order 
to obtain the group bonus it was necessary for teams to 
record diagnoses for doctor visits at a significantly higher 
rate than before intervention. The proportion of monthly 
doctor visits having recorded diagnoses was selected as 
the main measure to study the effect of implementing 
group bonuses. In practice this meant that to get a group 
bonus a care team had to take care that diagnoses were 
recorded in more than 75  % of all doctor visits of that 
team. Diagnoses were recorded with ICD-10 or ICPC 
systems by the doctors. Both systems, Effica and Finstar, 
gave a similar specific place in the electric patient chart 
where appropriate ICPC-2 or ICD-10 diagnoses could be 
placed during the patient visit. Both systems assisted the 
GP to find a proper diagnosis code or allowed the doctor 
to use directly the right code for the desired diagnosis.
To commit the staff to the change in function, a mul-
tidisciplinary team contract was signed with the mem-
bers of the care teams. The contract defined the rules and 
approaches of the functions of the teams. The team con-
tracts were signed by all of the five service areas between 
1.3.2005 and 30.5.2005, which was considered to be the 
time of the start of the intervention. The data was spe-
cifically derived from the electrical Effica patient chart 
system (Tieto LTD, Helsinki, Finland) from which the 
data had been reliably obtainable since 1.5.2003. No ethi-
cal approval was required because this study was made 
directly from the patient registry without identifying the 
patients. The registry keeper (the health authorities of 
Espoo and Vantaa) granted permission to carry on the 
study. The report generator provided figures for the total 
number of doctor visits, the number of recorded diagno-
ses and thus a percentage for the recording of diagnoses 
for each individual doctor and thereby also for the care 
unit per month. This allowed the calculation of a mean 
of these percentages for each individual care team (mean 
care unit-level percentage of doctor visits with marked 
diagnoses/care unit/month) which was thus the main 
measure for analysis in the present study.
The obtained data were analyzed by comparing the 
recording of diagnoses during similar time periods before 
and after the initiation of group bonuses to all nurses and 
doctors belonging to the care teams (intervention) in pri-
mary care in Espoo city.
As control data, we had the corresponding data on 
the single doctor and care team level frequencies of the 
recording of monthly diagnoses from two different pri-
mary care units where no similar team incentives were 
applied: dental primary care of Espoo and Länsimäki–
Hakunila primary care health center from the neighbor-
ing city of Vantaa. Vantaa resembles Espoo in its location 
(neighboring Helsinki) and number of inhabitants (about 
200,000) and also in other factors such as age, sex, mor-
bidity levels, deprivation and other demographic factors 
as much as possible in Finland (see http://www.aluesaar-
jat.fi, and http://pxweb2.stat.fi/database/StatFin/data-
basetree_fi.asp) and therefore we have used Vantaa as a 
control in our former studies of primary care, too [19].
From Espoo dental care the data were analogously 
obtainable from 1.5.2003 (also using Effica patient chart 
system, Tieto LTD, Helsinki, Finland). The data of the 
combined Länsimäki–Hakunila health center were 
obtained from Finstar patient chart system (Logica LTD, 
Helsinki, Finland). To get reliable data from Finstar-sys-
tem the report generator requires precise pre-identifica-
tion of the doctor under study at a given time point and 
it is therefore not able to produce continuous monthly 
data throughout the whole system, as is the Effica sys-
tem. Therefore the busiest month of the year (November) 
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was chosen as the control data and comparisons between 
controls were made by using this single time period.
The Effect of the intervention on the mean team-based 
percentage of monthly doctor visits with recorded diag-
noses was monitored for a 2  years time period before 
intervention and 1.5 years after it. Since the group bonus 
system was altered in such a way that after 2010, e.g. dur-
ing 2011 and 2012, the recording of diagnoses did not 
produce a financial bonus for the care team, we collected 
the data of the same parameter from the teams existing 
in Espoo health center in November 2011 and 2012 after 
the cessation of the intervention. In this way we hoped to 
have some information about how enduring the changes 
obtained with the team bonus combined with team con-
tract were.
The within-care team variation in Espoo primary care, 
Espoo dental care and Länsimäki–Hakunila primary care 
were analyzed by using the mean team-based percentage 
of monthly doctor visits with recorded diagnoses over 
the whole study period. The comparisons were then per-
formed by using One Way Repeated Measures ANOVA 
with suitable corrections (Bonferroni) for multiple com-
parisons when following the development of the studied 
units as a function of time. One way ANOVA on Ranks 
followed by Dunns’ test was used to compare Espoo pri-
mary care with the control units at corresponding time 
points. The rate of change in diagnosis marking was ana-
lyzed with regression analysis followed by t-test (GLM 
procedure of Sigma Plot 10.0 Statistical Software, Systat 
Software Inc.,Richmond, CA, USA) [20, 21].
Results
In Espoo primary care, the mean number of monthly 
visits in office-hour services of primary care doctors was 
about 18,000 in 2003–2006 and in primary care EDs the 
mean number of doctor visits per month was about 4000 
in the same period suggesting a total number of about 
22,000 monthly doctor visits in the whole public primary 
care system of Espoo city. In the complementary private 
sector primary care the mean number of monthly doctor 
visits was about 4500 in 2006. The mean team-based per-
centage of monthly doctor visits with recorded diagno-
ses increased from about 55 to 90 % after application of 
group bonuses in Espoo primary care (one way repeated 
measures analysis of variance P < 0.001; Figs. 1, 2). There 
was already a slight increase (0.79  ±  0.12  %/month, 
mean ± SEM) in the rate of marking diagnoses before the 
intervention in Espoo primary care. However, during the 
six first months of intervention this rate doubled statis-
tically significantly to 1.65 ± 0.39 %/month (P = 0.005). 
After the six first months of intervention, the increase in 
the rate plateaued to the level of 0.31 ±  0.07  %/month, 
which was statistically significantly less than before the 
intervention (P = 0.002) or during the first six months of 
the intervention (P < 0.001).
Simultaneously, when the group bonus system was 
associated with an increased proportion of monthly doc-
tor visits having recorded diagnoses in care teams of 
Espoo primary care there were no increases in the same 
parameters in either of the controls (Fig.  2). The team-
based mean percentage in recording diagnoses did not 
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Fig. 1 Mean team-based percentage of monthly doctor visits with 
marked diagnoses 2003–2006. Means and SEM are presented
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marked diagnoses in intervention group Espoo primary care and in 
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differ statistically significantly in Espoo primary care and 
Länsimäki–Hakunila, but in both these units this fre-
quency was statistically significantly higher than in Espoo 
dental care in the beginning of the follow up period in 
2003 (one way ANOVA on ranks P < 0.001, Dunns’ test, 
P  <  0.05). However, after the intervention in 2005 and 
2006 the mean frequency of recording diagnoses was 
higher in Espoo primary care teams than in either of the 
teams of the control units (one way ANOVA on ranks 
P < 0.001). The rate of marking diagnoses increased in in 
the Espoo primary care 12.95 ±  1.13 %/year during the 
follow up time. This was statistically significantly more 
(P  <  0.001) than in either of the controls: in Hakunila–
Länsimäki primary care (Vantaa) this rate (mean ± SEM) 
was 1.99  ±  3.05  %/year and in Espoo dental primary 
care it was negative −0.53 ± 0.53 %/year. In practice this 
means that the controls did not differ from each other 
statistically significantly and that there was no change 
in the rate of marking diagnoses in either of the controls 
during the follow up.
The mean team-based percentage of monthly doc-
tor visits with recorded diagnoses started to decrease 
within 2 years of cessation of the team bonus (2010; 
one way analysis of variance on Ranks, P < 0001, Fig. 3). 
During the first full year after intervention (2005–2006) 
the rate of recording diagnoses was still increasing 
(4.82 ±  2.07  %/year) but it was statistically significantly 
different (P < 0.001) from the respective rate during the 
first full year after cessation of the bonuses (2011–2012) 
when this parameter decreased to −19.70 ± 6.56 %/year.
In 2005, 28.9 % of staff of the care teams received group 
bonuses. Mean annual group bonus varied between 
205.15 and 601.77 €/person depending on the care 
team. In the second year of intervention (2006), 49.1  % 
of the staff of these teams received group bonuses worth 
592.45–768.75 €/person.
Discussion
A financial incentive, introducing group bonus with 
team contracts, improved the recording of diagnoses in 
the patient charts. Neither in the dental unit of Espoo, 
which here represented the part of the same primary care 
organization where no intervention was applied (e.g. dif-
ferent specialization in the same organization; internal 
local control) nor in Länsimäki–Hakunila, which here 
represented a neighboring organization with the same 
specialization (e.g. somatic primary care in different 
organization: external peer control) were there similar 
increases in the studied parameters during the same time 
period. Although differences across computer systems 
exist and even these systems may be predictors of care 
quality outcomes [22] this does not explain the results of 
our study because we had an internal control (primary 
dental care of Espoo) which used the same computerized 
patient chart system as the intervened Espoo primary 
care.
Before the intervention it was expected that the low 
level of recording diagnoses was due to different admin-
istration and management cultures in different health 
service areas, lack of permanent doctors and deficiency 
in tutor services. However, financial incentives combined 
with team contracts with the care teams seemed to over-
come these putative hindrances to proper recording of 
patient data. The present finding with group bonuses is in 
line with a former study where financial incentives to GPs 
increased diagnosis making and recording of certain dis-
eases [7, 9]. Altogether, our work with other recent stud-
ies suggests that financial incentives may be used to alter 
behavior of physicians towards improving the quality of 
care [8, 23–26]. Furthermore, financial incentives may 
promote other important values in primary care such as 
reduction of inequalities in the delivery of clinical care 
related to area deprivation [6].
Whether rewarding staff with financial incentives leads 
to real quality improvement in care is still an open ques-
tion [27]. Evidence about the effectiveness of this kind of 
intervention at the population level appear contradictory 
as in a large scale former study there was no evidence of 
lower mortality rates of the population [12] but in another 
study of similar scale there was evidence for reduction in 
emergency hospital admissions after a pay-for perfor-
mance intervention for GPs [10]. Altogether, this means 
that one must choose carefully the measures of improved 
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care: a hard end point like mortality is not easily affected 
[15]. Furthermore, improved recording of diabetes and 
related parameters does not automatically guarantee better 
care of the disease itself [28] and improvements in quality 
aspects of care do not automatically result in better out-
comes of care [8]. Nevertheless, recorded diagnoses make 
it possible to analyze data further and possibly find areas of 
improvement in the local quality of care [17]. Several ques-
tions, such as how reliable and valid the data obtained with 
the present intervention is, have to be answered before giv-
ing any recommendations about the usefulness of group 
bonuses in improving clinical practices.
There appeared to be units where frequencies of 
recording diagnoses in doctor visits decreased after ces-
sation of payment of the group bonuses. This latter is in 
line with former reports suggesting that those parameters 
in quality work which are not sustained with financial 
incentives to GPs may even weaken, if improving other 
parameters is rewarded [6, 29]. Yet, partial withdrawal 
of financial incentives did not largely hamper results 
obtained with this type of intervention to GPs [11]. Alto-
gether, financial incentives have been reported to provide 
large initial gains which, however, diminished over time 
[8]. This holds true for financial incentives directed to 
patients, too: only that part of behavior which is paid for 
is improved [30]. Thus, the eventual consequences of the 
behavior change are not necessarily in line with the origi-
nal intention of the intervention driven with economic 
incentives [8, 30]. The present follow-up time (2 years) is 
relatively short to answer the question of what will even-
tually happen in the long term when the group bonuses 
are totally withdrawn. Yet, the level of recording diagno-
ses in 2012 was still clearly superior to the years before 
the intervention (2003 and 2004). Altogether, the present 
finding is thus in line with a hypothesis that financial 
incentives are effective primers in interventions of pri-
mary care [6, 8], even when group incentives to the care 
team are applied.
Conclusion
Group bonuses may provide a method to improve clinical 
practices in primary care. Yet the putative desired effects 
obtained with these financial incentives may slowly start 
to erode if these bonuses are withdrawn.
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